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Sexual Freedom For Consenting
Adults-Why Not?
Social attitudes of contemporary Americans have evolved away
from many of the sexual biases derived from Victorian heritage.
Sexual behavior, once a forbidden topic, is now openly explored.
With man's increased awareness concerning sexual attitudes it be-

comes increasingly difficult if not impossible to identify forms of
sexual behavior that are "deviant". The Californialegislature, with
the recent introduction of a measure to reform California laws on
deviant sexual acts, has shown some awareness of changing social

attitudes toward sexual behavior. This comment attempts to set
out the reasons why reform of California's anachronistic penal
laws proscribingcertain sexual behavior between consenting adults
is necessary.
It is a crime to call sin a crime, and a sin to let real crime go unpunished because of a passion for ferreting out sin.1

With the increased liberalism in society's attitudes towards sex,
pressure has been exerted on the legislature to reform California's ar-

chaic penal sanctions proscribing deviant sexual behavior. In both the
1969 and 1970 sessions of the legislature, bills have been introduced

proposing modernization of the statutes by deleting provisions which are
no longer enforced.2 Assemblyman Willie Brown of San Francisco intr6duced these bills' proposing to terminate the existing discrimination

against "minority groups" (homosexuals) and to eliminate the "hypocrisy" in the law. 4 His attempts proved unsuccessful.

The bill intro-

1 McCabe, The Fearless Spectator, San Francisco Chronicle, February 25, 1970,

at 35.

2 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 286, 288a, presently make no distinction between heterosexual and homosexual acts, or relationships of the parties involved; however as will
be pointed out enforcement of these statutes against these different groups is far from
equal.
3 A.B. 743, 1969 Regular Session; A.B. 701, 1970 Regular Session.
4 Bill to Legalize Homosexuality, San Francisco Chronicle, March 3, 1969, quote
by Assemblyman Willie L. Brown, Jr.: "They tend to treat them (homosexuals) as
they do blacks and other minorities-as less than human beings." See also Horton,
San Francisco Takes Care of Its Own, Sacramento Union, March 19, 1969, at 10 where
Brown said:
"I think we should eliminate as much as we can the hypocrisy in our laws. Obviously,
this is one of the most hypocritical areas ....
[We should eliminate laws that
demean both the enforcer and the person against whom it is enforced-where there is
no victim."
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duced in the 1969 session received no support and died in the Criminal Procedure Committee. The same fate befell the 1970 bill; however,
at one point early in the session indications were that the measure would
come out of committee and reach the assembly floor. There were some
off the record comments from individuals associated with the Criminal
Procedure Committee to the effect that, if the author (Brown) could
muster the necessary 41 votes to pass the bill out of the assembly, the
chairman of the Criminal Procedure Committee could assure passage
of the bill out of committee. During an election year however, this
possibility was just a vain gesture and served as another method to
"kill" proposed legislation without putting the blame directly on anyone.
The 1970 bill, a duplicate of the 1969 bill, proposes the following
changes to the present law:

(a) deviant sexual acts between consenting adults would no longer
be considered a crime. No distinction is made as to the sexes of the
parties involved (homosexual or heterosexual acts) or their relationships;

(b) the term "infamous crime against nature" presently in our penal
code would be deleted and the code would instead provide for an offense termed sodomy-defined in the code as anal intercourse between
humans;
(c) oral copulation would be a crime under the same circumstances
as sodomy. The special circumstances under which sodomy or oral
copulation would be punishable and the degree of punishment imposed
were: first, if one of the parties was under 18 and more than three
years younger than the other, then the maximum prison term would be
15 years; or, second, if one of the parties was under 14 and more than
ten years younger than the other, then the prison term would be three
years to life. A third punishable offense would require the use of
force, violence, duress, menace or threat of great bodily harm by one
of the parties. The latter offense would not have included any age
limitation and would have subjected offenders to a prison sentence of
from three years to life. The effect of this proposed legislation would
be to re-define deviant sexual acts and eliminate provisions from the
present statutes which are no longer enforced.'
The American Law Institute in a 1955 draft excluded from its category of punishable sex crimes private homosexual sex conduct not in5 Present statutes (see note 2 supra) make no distinction as to the relation-

ships of the parties thereby allowing prosecutions for deviant sexual acts committed
between husband and wife, as well as between parties of the same sex.
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volving force, imposition or corruption of the young., The reasons
given were that the existing law is for the most part unenforced, and
there is no prospect of real enforcement except in cases involving violence, corruption of minors, or public solicitation.
Under section 213.2 of the 1962 official draft of the Model Penal
Code, deviate sexual intercourse is made punishable only when committed by force or its equivalent. 7 Force or its equivalent includes
threats of death or serious bodily harm, and impairment of one's control by use of stimulants, drugs, or intoxicants. Subdivision 2 covers
commission of deviant sexual intercourse upon one suffering from a
mental disease or defect of which the actor is aware. The draft deals
with corruption of minors under section 213.3 setting out the parties,

ages and relationships constituting a violation of the code.8
Legislation which substantially follows the recommendations of the
American Law Institute has been proposed by states other than California. Illinois,' Minnesota,' and New York" have enacted statutes
nearly identical with the Model Code provisions. The statutes of these
three states provide no penalty for deviant consensual sex acts committed in private. Rather, the statutes direct their attention toward protecting society's interest in being free from overt sexual aggression, the
protection of minors and the protection against public displays. In addition to this more practical approach adopted in three of the major
states of the United States, some major European countries have also
enacted statutes regarding sexual conduct which treat the problem in
the manner of the Model Code, punishing deviant sex acts only when
committed by force or violence, or with minors, or in public.' " During a recent world-wide seminar in which fifty countries were officially
represented a resolution was adopted by the body which expressly delineated the situations where deviant sexual behavior should be punishable.'" In light of the significant evidence that many authorities believe
6 AMERICAN LAw INSmTTUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE

Draft No. 4, 1955).

7 MODEL PENAL CODE,

§ 207.5, Comment (Tent.

§ 213.2, (Official Draft, 1962).

8 Id. at § 213.3.
9
10

ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
MINN. CRim. CODE

38, § 11.
§ 609.30.

11 N.Y. PEN.
12

CODE § 135.00.
Report to the Hague: Suggested Revisions of Penal Laws Relating to Sex

Crimes and Crimes Against the Family, 50 CORNELL L. QUARTERLY 425, 439, n. 16

(1965).

Id. at 441, where the following resolution was adopted:
The criminal law should prohibit deviant and homosexual behavior under
the following circumstances:
13

a. Where force or violence is used to compel deviant or homosexual
behavior.

b. Where a minor is involved in homosexual or deviant behavior by an

adult.
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laws regulating sexual deviant conduct are a proper area for reform,
reform is dreadfully slow in coming. One might suggest an analogy to

the historic M'Naghten test for insanity. Despite the evolution of social awareness that the rule, strictly applied, failed to serve the true ends
of justice, the social attitudes and limited scientific knowledge of the
1840's has been allowed an imposing position in contemporary Ameri-

can jurisprudence. 14

To appreciate the reasoning asserted to justify

reform of the present California law attention must first be directed toward the problem of resolving what deviant sexual conduct is and when
it is proscribed. Second, and more important is the consideration of the
historical background and the impact of social attitudes on the development of the penal sanctions.
The Meaning of Deviant Sexual Conduct
Deviant sexual behavior, as proscribed by modem statutes, is a rather
vague concept at best. This label, deviant sexual behavior, applies to
several different sexual acts. The obvious question to be resolved is.
what is the "existing standard" from which one may deviate? A simple
definition of this "existing standard" (making it possible to distinguish
natural from unnatural acts) is that any sex act not furthering the primary function of sex, (procreation) is deviant and punishable. 5
Applying this existing standard, the following acts have been categorized as deviant:"8
(1) Oral copulation, which is the act of copulating the mouth of
one person with the sexual organ of another.'7
Oral copulation can be further separated into fellatio and cunnilingus. Fellatio is the sexual act consummated between the male sex organ

of one person and the mouth of another,

with the mouth and female sex organ.
c.

8

and cunnilingus is committed

9

Where an individual in a position of trust and confidence abuses his

position and involves his ward or the person entrusted to his care in deviant
or homosexual behavior.
d. Where the homosexual or deviant behavior occurs openly causing a
public scandal or disturbance.
e. Where the homosexual or deviant behavior involves prostitution commercialization.
Homosexual behavior either male or female between consenting adults which
does not violate any of the aforementioned elements should not be prohibited
by the criminal law.
14 See GUTrMACHER & WEIHOFERR, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 401-420 (1952).

15 A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, C. MARTIN, AND P. GEBHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN

THE HUMAN FEMALE (1953) [hereinafter cited as KINSEY, FEMALE].
18 It should be noted at this point that this comment when referring to deviant

sexual conduct does not include masochistic or sadistic acts or acts involving physical
pain to one of the parties involved for purposes of sexual pleasure.
17 Black's Law Dictionary 445 (Rev. 4th ed. 1951).
18 Id. at 743.
19 Id. at 456.
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(2) Anal intercourse (buggery) is another type of deviant sexual
behavior and is committed with the male sex organ and the anus of
another.

20

(3) Beastiality, is the third type of deviant conduct. It consists of
with a brute or animal of the subcarnal copulation of a human being
21
human orders of the opposite sex.

The above acts may be committed by either a homosexual couple or
a heterosexual couple or any combination thereof. 22 The law, as will be
observed, does not distinguish the relationships of the parties when defining deviant conduct. 23 Strict interpretation of the statutes makes a
married couple committing any of the above defined acts just as guilty as
a non-married couple and, heterosexuals are as guilty as homosexuals.
In addition to the homosexual and heterosexual classification, a further
complication occurs where one of the parties is a minor.2 4 (Acts with
minors are necessarily a separate category. Advocates for legalizing
private deviant acts have no inclination to alter or reduce punishment
25
for acts involving a minor).

HistoricalDevelop~ment of Penal SanctionsAgainst Deviant
Sexual Behavior

Homosexuality has been condemned as "that abominable sin not fit
to be named among Christians.

' 26

The historical development of the

law is rooted in the early English common law and throughout this de20

Id. at 243.

21

Id. at 203.

"Homosexual" is usually referred to when speaking of malcs, whereas, the
term "Lesbian" connotes female relationships.
23 Hefner, The Legal Enforcement of Morality, 40 U. CoLo. L. REV. 199, 212
(1968). [hereinafter cited as Hefner]:
what is even less clearly recognized is that of all these statutes forbidding
sodomy, only New York's makes a distinction between the married and the
unmarried (footnote omitted). Our state governments thus specify, quite
literally, where a husband and wife may, and may not, kiss one another and
the manner in which the sex act may be initiated and carried out in the
marriage bed without becoming illegal.
24 Deviant sexual conduct with minors can be further classified as heterosexual
and homosexual. Laws prohibiting homosexual acts involving a minor, either as a
consenting party, or under duress, are usually more stringently enforced and vigorously
prosecuted than are laws prohibiting consensual heterosexual acts involving a minor.
Comment, Private Consensual Homosexual Behavior: The Crime and Its Enforcement, 70 YALE L.J. 623 (1961).
25 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 261-264.1.
Under these rape provisions, heterosexual
conduct with a minor is punishable. At the same time, providing the sexual act is
punishable pursuant to one of the previously defined deviant acts (Cal. Pen. Code
§§ 286, 288a) the actor could conceivably be prosecuted under either th6 Penal Code
provisions for rape or these deviant sexual conduct statutes, or both. Inevitably a
rape conviction is usually sought. Heterosexual acts involving a minor are usually
punishable under a different Penal Code section.
26 THE HOLY BIBLE, Leviticus 20:13 (King James version).
See also M. HOFFmAN, THE GAY WoRLD 100 (1968) [hereinafter cited as GAY WORLD].
22
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velopment, the Church has played an influential role.2 7 The Church's
moral doctrines are best expressed by the oft-quoted biblical phrase,
"Thou shalt not lie with mankind as with womankind: it is abomination. '28 The Church's influence has not only affected the making of the
law, but also its interpretation. The courts from the time of Lord Coke
have developed a reluctance to be specific as to which acts are forbidden.29 Such phrases as the "abominable and detestable crime against
nature" began to appear in state statutes with increased frequency. 0
Arguably, the Church's own inability to cope with the problem of
clearly-defining those acts looked upon as "unnatural" resulted in
the development of an attitude by the courts of deliberate vagueness
and led judges to make such statements as, "We regret that the importance of this question renders it necessary to soil the pages of our reports

with a discussion of a subject (oral-genital contact) so loathsome and
disgusting as the one confronting us."'"
27 KINSEY, FEMALE at 482-483 where it was concluded that the historical influence of religious groups demonstrates that condemnation of homosexual activities found
its origin in the Seventh Century B.C.:
Both mouth-genital contacts and homosexual activities had previously been

associated with the Jewish religious service, as they had been with the religious
services of most of the other peoples of that part of Asia, and just as they
have been in many other cultures elsewhere in the world. In the wave of
nationalism which was then developing among the Jewish people, there was
an attempt to dis-identify themselves with their neighbors by breaking with
many of the customs which they had previously shared with them. Many
of the Talmudic condemnations were based on the fact that such activities
represented the way of the Canaanite, the way of the Chaldean, the way of
the pagan, and they were originally condemned as a form of idolatry rather
than a sexual crime. Throughout the Middle Ages, homosexuality was associated with heresay. The reform in the custom soon, however, became a matter
of morals, and finally a question for action under criminal law.
Jewish sex codes were brought over into Christian codes by the early
adherents of the Church, including St. Paul, who had been raised in the
Jewish tradition on matters of sex. The Catholic sex code is an almost precise continuation of the more ecclesiastic law and dominated on all questions of
morals and subsequently became the basis for the English common law, the
statute laws of England, and the laws of the various states of the United
States. This accounts for the considerable conformity between the Talmudic
and Catholic codes and the present-day statute law on sex, including laws on
homosexual activity.
28 Leviticus 18:22.
29 M. PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW (rev. ed. 1962):
Ever since Lord Coke's time, the attitude of judges has been that sodomy is
"a detestable and abominable sin among Christians not to be named." The
result of this attitude is a sharp departure from the usual rules of criminal
pleading. It is one of the basic cannons of criminal procedure that a defendant is entitled to know the particulars of the crime charged against him....
But when a man is charged with sodomy or a crime against nature, an indictment in the language of the statute is enough. It is enough that the indictment alleges that at a particular time and place the defendant committed
a "crime against nature" with a specific person. The defendant need not be
informed of the particular sexual perversion which is charged against him.
30 Presently the following states use the term "crime against nature": Arizona,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, N. Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Virginia, W. Virginia.
31 State v. Whitmarsh, 26 S.D. 426, 429, 128 N.W. 580, 581 (1910).
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There has generally been a lack of certainty in statements identifying
what acts are actually prohibited. An example of this confusion is apparent in the statutes originating during Henry VIII's reign which referred to acts with beasts or buggery of man as crimes against nature

but contained no proscription of oral-genital acts.3 2 This omission,
coupled with the fact that there was no distinction between homosexual
and heterosexual activity in the statutes, created a paradox for that
era.3 3 A situation could have existed where a man who performed anal
intercourse with his wife was guilty of sodomy.3 4 But a homosexual
pair performing mutual fellatio were not engaged in illegal conduct.3
Although the law did not, nor does it today, distinguish between
homosexual and heterosexual conduct, the law has not been equally
enforced between the two groups.3 6 The following rationale is reflective
of that point:
In the enforcement of the laws . . . a disporportionately high
percentage of sodomy arrests and convictions involve homosexual
contacts-presumably because a heterosexual cop and a heterosexual
judge find a homosexual crime against nature a good deal more
37
abominable and detestable than a heterosexual one.

Perhaps human nature has influenced the decisions of the persons responsible for enforcing the laws.
PresentLaws ConcerningDeviant Sexual Behavior
And Their Enforcement
The laws in California proscribing deviant sexual acts are Penal
Code section 286, which makes the "infamous crime against nature" a
felony," and Penal Code section 288a, which defines sex perversion
32 Hefner at 211:

Although English common law, from Which our statutes on the subject are
derived, defined and prohibited only buggery with mankind or beast as "the
crime against nature", which act carried the death penalty, a majority of the
present-day American statutes include both oral and anal intercourse under
sodomy.
33 GAY WORLD at 79-80; R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE 206 (3rd
ed. 1966).
34 Sodomy, for purposes of this paper, is defined as a carnal copulation by human
beings with each other against nature, or with beast. It is often used as meaning "the
crime against nature", or carnal copulation by man with man, or, in the same unnatural manner with woman or with a beast. See Br~cr's LAw DICTiONARY 1563 (Rev.
4th ed. 1951).
35 GAY WORLD at 80-81.
36 KiNsEY, FEMALE at 483; Cantor, Deviation and the Criminal Law, 55 J.C.L.
441, 451 (1964).
37 Hefner at 215.
38 CAL. PEN. CODE § 286.
Sodomy; punishment
Every person who is guilty of the infamous crime against nature, committed
with mankind or with any animal, is punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison for not less than one year.
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and makes oral copulation a crime.3 9 Neither section distinguishes
between the sex or relationship of the parties.
A general reluctance on the part of the legislature to clearly define
the "infamous crimes against nature" has resulted in ambiguity in the
statutes and confusion for the public. Perhaps the legislature is to
blame.4 0 However, a logical assumption would be that the historic development of deviant sexual behavior laws was so strongly influenced

by the Church, that these religious overtones still remain.

Conse-

quently, the statutes today reflect a confused mixture of sin and crime
sprinkled with religious views from various periods of society.

Not only has the legislature been reluctant to limit this broad statute,
but the courts, typically the protectors of society when the lawmakers
traverse beyond permitted limits, have acquiesced at the legislature's
continued vagueness in defining deviant sexual behavior.
Courts conclusion in Honselman v. People:4 1

Note the

It was never the practice to describe the particular manner or
the details of the commission of the act, but the offense was treated
in the indictment as the abominable crime not fit to be named
among Christians. The existence of such an offense is a disgrace
to human nature. The legislature has not seen fit to define it further than by the general term, and the records of the courts need
not be defiled with the details of different acts which may go to
constitute it. A statement of the offense in the language of the
42
statute. . . is all that is required.
This is a drastic departure from the approach by courts when con39 CAL. PEN. CODE § 288a.
Perversion; copulation with the mouth; punishment
Any person participating in an act of copulating the mouth of one person
with the sexual organ of another is punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison for not exceeding 15 years, or by imprisonment in the county jail
not to exceed one year; provided, however, whenever any person is found
guilty of the offense specified herein, and it is charged and admitted or
found to be true that he is more than 10 years older than his coparticipant in
such an act, which coparticipant is under the age of 14, or that he has compelled the other's participation in such an act by force, violence, duress,
menace, or threat of great bodily harm, he shall be punished by imprisonment
in the state prison for not less than three years. The order of commitment
shall expressly state whether a person convicted hereunder is more than 10
years older than his coparticipant and whether such coparticipant is under the
age of 14. The order shall also state whether a person convicted hereunder
has compelled coparticipation in his act by force, violence, duress, menace,
or threat of great bodily harm.
40 Hefner at 211:
Some of the legislators responsible for initiating and passing the statutes
were apparently so embarrassed by the whole business that they offered no
further clue to the nature of the crime, except to state that it was illegal if
perpetrated "with mankind or beast."
41 Honselman v. People, 168 Ill. 172, 48 N.E. 304 (1897).
42 Id. at 174.
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fronted with many penal statutes which fail to provide sufficient clarity.4 3
Notwithstanding the possibility of broad application of laws prohibiting sexual deviant conduct case law has made enforcement of such laws
against deviant sexual acts virtually impossible when committed in private. The statutes 4 fail to distinguish between public and private acts,
however, courts, recognizing the constitutional right to privacy have
struck down enforcement techniques regarding private conduct under
the fourth amendment search and seizure prohibitions4' as an unwarranted intrusion upon that basic right to a reasonable expectation of
46
privacy.

In order to invade the privacy of a "private place" such as a home or
apartment, an officer must either obtain an arrest warrant or have probable cause for entering to make an arrest. Entry must be preceded
by compliance with knock and announcement requirements of Penal
Code section 844. Because consensual deviant sexual acts lack a
complaining party, arrest warrants are rarely obtained.4 7 Unless the
parties are extremely careless deviant sexual acts committed in private go
unpunished. 4 Therefore, the application of the deviant sexual conduct
sanctions appears to be limited only to those acts committed in public.
Authorities contend that nearly all public deviant sex conduct involves
homosexual acts of one form or another. Thus, be it a result of enforcement or judicial fiat, the meaning of deviant sexual conduct in society is
synonymous to homosexual conduct. 9
43 When dealing with sanctions abridging the 1st amendment freedom of speech,
the court has shown little reluctance to strike down vague statutes. See Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
44 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 286, 288a.
45 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
40 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949);
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
47 Symposium, The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Empirical
Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
718, n.199 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 13 U.C.L.A. L. Rnv.].
48 People v. Earl, 216 Cal. App. 2d 607 (1963).
49 Although there are cases on the books where heterosexual couples have been
prosecuted for violations of the deviant sex statutes see: Honselman v. People, 168
III. 172, 48 N.E. 304 (1897); People v. Doggett, 83 Cal. App. 2d 405 (1948). Cases
which have applied CAL. PEN. CODE § 288a to heterosexuals are; People v. Coleman,
.53 Cal. App. 2d 18 (1942); People v. Miller, 27 Cal. App. 2d 722 (1938); People v.
Briley, 9 Cal. App. 2d 84 (1935); People v. Jordan, 24 Cal. App. 2d 39 (1937) (which
applied to a third party assisting in the act). In comparing the enforcement of these
laws against heterosexuals and homosexuals, authorities agree that though the law makes
no distinction between the parties or their relationships, there are relatively few arrests
for heterosexual violations when compared to homosexual violations. One reason
given for this significant disparity in enforcement is that deviant heterosexual conduct
is not viewed with the same distaste as is homosexual conduct by the public. 0.
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The real problem encountered even when applying these provisions
only to homosexual conduct is the determination of when an act is private and when it is public and subject to enforcement. Distinguishing

between public and private sexual acts is elementary when the act is
committed within the privacy of one's bedroom compared to an act
committed on a public sidewalk. However, the line of demarcation is
extremely difficult to establish when the act is committed in a public
restroom behind the closed door of a bathroom stall, or in one's bedroom when the window shades are open. Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion in People v. Heath,5 0 attempted to define the line when
he said,
A man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects
privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to
the "plain view" of outsiders are not "protected" because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. 5 1
When the act is consummated in a public restroom the courts have
attempted to use a balancing test-balancing the expectation of privacy
against the public's interest in law enforcement. 52 Each case turns
upon its own facts and hence no uniform rule can be applied. In
People v. Norton53 the court concluded that the question of privacy
is eliminated in a situation where there are no doors on the toilet stalls.
The questionable situations such as when the enclosure does not go to
the floor, or when two men are seen entering the same stall have as yet
not been resolved.
In Smayda v. United States5 4 the court attempted to resolve the

question of privacy on the rationale that clandestine surveillance is
permissible for law enforcement officers if there is probable cause to
believe that deviant sex crimes will be committed at the appointed time
and place. The argument is that a balancing of the needs of society
against the individual's protection would now be based on a practical
rather than mechanical distinction. 55 A recent Los Angeles study concludes:
(1955). Note: 13 U.C.L.A. L. Rv.
at 689 wherein their research showed that nearly half of the arrests made for deviant
sexual violations are for acts that take place in a public restroom.
BurERFIELD, SEXUAL HARMoNY IN MARRIA E

50 People v. Heath, 266 Cal. App. 2d 754 (1968).
51 Id. at 757.
52 See Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251

(1965), in which the majority
concluded that police observations of a public restroom did not constitute unreasonable
search if the police, as here, have reasonable cause to believe the public toilet stalls
are being used in the commission of a crime and the observation is confined to times
when such crimes are most likely to occur.
See also Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469 (1962); Bielicki v. Superior Court,
57 Cal. 2d 602 (1962) relating to factual questions as to whether or not there was a
door on the stall and whether the enclosure extended to the floor.
53 People v. Norton, 209 Cal. App. 2d 173 (1962).
54 Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (1965).
55

13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. at 708-718.
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If alternative methods are adequate, there is no justification for
the intrusion on the privacy of innocent persons that necessarily results from clandestine surveillance. Expediency alone should not
justify such an intrustion. Since patrols by uniformed and plainclothes officers are not only available alternatives but apparently
more efficient ones, a policy allowing clandestine surveillance may
not be justified. 56
One example of proper use of this method under the Smayda rule
would be to allow observation for limited periods of time (e.g., between
the hours of 10 and 12 p.m.) in public restrooms reasonably believed
to be meeting places of homosexuals. However, close judicial controls
are necessary to ensure the minimal amount of infringement on the
right to personal privacy of innocent parties using the public toilet.
Though the law is limited in application to public conduct and the
conduct referred to is primarily homosexual, there is still a more limiting
factor evidenced from application. That is, there exists a significant
difference between arrests of the male homosexual as compared to the
female. Authorities have demonstrated that the laws are not enforced
against the female homosexual as rigidly as against the male.57 One
explanation that has been offered is:
Lesbians are described by the police as less aggressive and promiscuous than males; they do not constantly seek new partners and
contacts. As a result. . female activity is much less conspicious
than that of males and less likely to offend the public. s

This discriminatory practice also occurs frequently in governmental
agencies. A recent article in Time Magazine revealed that, "While it
(Civil Service Commission) ignores most violators of fornication laws,
it investigates male homosexuality more often than lesbians, whom the
commission regards as less repugnant to the public."' 0 Moreover, because women are outwardly less aggressive than men, society is more
willing to accept female homosexuality. 0 Because of female passiveness, bars, parks, public toilets, and bath houses are not used by the
woman deviate as they are by the male deviate. 1
56 Id. at 712.
57 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. at 740; Cantor, Deviation and The Criminal Law, 55

J.C.L. 441 (1965); Gay World 167, 175-176.
58 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv.at 740.
59 A PuritanicalGovernment, TIME, April 27, 1970, at 60.
60 Society puts much less of a burden on a lesbian than on a male homosexual
couple. It is much less likely to suspect a sexual involvement between two women
who are living together or who are known to be (at least socially) intimate. GAY
WORLD, 175-176.
61 GAY WORLD at 167.
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One should not assume that the disparity in chargeable offenses between female homosexuals and male homosexuals is the result of the
nonexistence of a significant female homosexual population. A recent
study of 1200 females revealed that one-half had experienced intense
emotional relations with other females, and over 300 reported having
had sexual activities with other women. 62 The 1948 Kinsey Report
concluded that 20 percent of the total white female population have had
some overt homosexual experience prior to age forty-five.6 3
An examination of a similar study concerning the male population
reveals that 37 percent of all white males have experienced at least some
overt homosexual experience to the point of orgasm between adolescence and old age. 64 Twenty-five percent of those surveyed had experienced more than incidental homosexual conduct while between the
ages of 16 and 55; 15 percent had at least as much homosexual as
heterosexual experience (bisexual); and 10 percent of the males surveyed were characterized as exclusively homosexual. 65 A permissible
inference derived from these studies would be that since males and
females have similar experience patterns concerning homosexuality both
sexes should have relatively similar populations of homosexuals. Yet
female homosexuals are a very small part of the incidence of chargeable
criminal sexual conduct. Possibly the reason is that although the behavior is the same and the rate of the acts are the same, the conduct is

different, i.e., the male's acts are public while the female consorts in
private. The difference in conduct then could result in the difference
in chargeable violations. Hence, the primary target of the statutes
prosecuting deviant sexual conduct is essentially the male homosexual.
Apprehending the Offenders
In addition to the unequal enforcement problems encountered, consensual deviant sexual acts do not involve a complaining victim. In
most crimes the police do not arrest in the absence of a complaining victim simply because they have no method of determining a crime has in
fact been committed. Therefore, in the absence of a complaint, the
police must catch the violator in the act of committing a criminal violation. Various methods are used by the law enforcement officers to
enforce deviant sex acts, the most common of which is the "decoy"
method. Usually a pair of plainclothes police officers work together.
62 M. PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAw, 204-206 (rev. ed. 1962).
63 KINSEY, FEMALE at 490.
64 A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEmVIOR IN THE HuMAN MALE

650 (1948) [hereinafter cited as KINsEY, MALE].
63 Id. at 650-651.
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One officer positions himself nearby, while the other loiters near a public toilet known to be a meeting place for homosexuals. 6 This method,
though effective, invariably invites the defense of entrapment. 7 The
defense arises on the rationale that the crime would not have been committed but for the conduct of the "decoy" and that such encouragement
is against public policy.'
The validity of the defense depends upon whether the intent to commit the crime originated in the mind of the defendant or was planted in

his mind by the officer's words, conduct or both. The prosecution, in
an attempt to nullify the defense, can argue that the pre-existing criminal intent of the defendant can be inferred from the readiness of the defendant to submit to the inducement. 69 The problem incurred, when
the entrapment defense is raised, is that the offense hinges upon the
officer's word against that of the defendant unless the officer's partner
is present at the time of the solicitation.7"
An additional problem can exist when the decoy method is employed.
On occasions the homosexual is abused by the police. Examples of such
abuses are when the arresting officer allows the homosexual to commit a
sex act with him before he identifies himself and when the officer gives
the homosexual a choice of oral copulation with him or being arrested. 1
Another frequently used method of enforcement is the "peep-hole"
or observation technique. 72 This method is usually employed in public
restrooms. An officer locates himself in such a manner that he can

readily observe a public toilet for a long period of time. The peep-hole
method itself may be challenged as unconstitutional because indiscriminate use would constitute an unreasonable search in that it involves invasion of the personal right to privacy. 73 As previously mentioned,
there is a "gray area" involved when determining whether an act is public or private.
60 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. at 686: Out of 475 misdemeanor arrests, 243 were by
the decoy method.
67 Schwartz, Morals Oflenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLuM. L. REv.

669, 676 (1963).
68 People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1 (1959).
69 Id. at 12.
70 For complete analysis see 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 690-707.
71 GAY WORLD at 88 where it was pointed out that:
Homosexuals sometimes allege that police officers will arrest them and then
either make a deal with the homosexual in which he has the choice of either
orally copulating the officer or being arrested, or, more diabolically, will
entice the homosexual'into orally copulating him before revealing his identity, and then will arrest him anyway.
See People v. Spaulding, 81 Cal. App. 615 (1927).

13 U.C.L.A. L. REv.at 707-718.
See note 52 supra, and the discussion relating to the court's attempt to distinguish between public and private acts.
72
73

1971 / Sexual Freedom for Consenting Adults
A less frequently used method of enforcement is that of routine
patrol, harassment, and revocation of licenses of establishments that
cater to the homosexual. Liquor licenses can and have been revoked
because the bar caters to homosexuals. 74 The official reason for revocation of the liquor license given by the State Alcoholic Beverage Control
is generally not the actual reason for such action . 7 This method is intended to discourage homosexual activity. Needless to say, it also raises

constitutional questions concerning equal protection. If it can be shown
that the harassment is directed towards homosexuals solely because they
are homosexuals, such harassment can constitute a violation of the equal
protection clause. 76 The victim, however, must show that the revocation was arbitrary, selective, and the result of intentional discrimina77
tion.
THE PROBLEM-SHOULD SEXUAL DEVIATE BEHAVIOR BE
LEGISLATED AGAINST?
What are the causes of Homosexual and Heterosexual deviant behavior? Early theorists regarded homosexuality as an anomaly "...
due to some congenial quirk or due to a form of dissipation during
life."178 Modernly many authorities regard homosexuality as purely
emotional arising from "mental conflicts encountered during childhood."79 Whether or not homosexuality is a sickness appears to be
an unresolved question."
One of the authorities who believes that homosexuality is related to
emotional disorder is Dr. Irving Bieber who contends that homosexuality
is a result of the family environment. Though oversimplified, the central point of his thesis is that homosexuality results from an overbearing
mother and a passive father. From early childhood the mother favors
the child and takes away any identity he would normally develop toward
masculinity. This repression later creates an inability on the part of the
74
76

76

13 U.C.L.A.

Id.

L. REv. at 725-734.

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); People v. Darcy, 59 Cal. App. 2d

342 (1943) (dissenting opinion).

77 People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1962);
People v. Harris, 182 Cal. App. 2d 837 (App. Div. Super. Ct. 1960). See also U.S.

Study Calls for New Homosexual Laws, San Francisco Chronicle, October 21, 1969, at
1, where Evelyn Hooker a psychologist from UCLA concluded:
There is evidence to indicate . . ., that existing laws are selectively enforced
and that serious injustice often results.
78 Cantor, Deviation and the CriminalLaw, 55 J.C.L. 441 (1964).
79

Id. at 442.

8o See SYMONDS, A PROBLEM IN MODERN ETHIcs, reprinted in CORY, HOMOSEXUALITY, A CRoss CULTURAL APPROACH (1956); CARPENTER, THE INDETERMINATE
SEx, also reprinted in CORY; ROBERTIELLO, VOYAGE FROM LEsBos
HOMOSEXUALrrY (1956).

(1959);

BERGLER,
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child to relate sexually to women.8 1

Many would argue that homosexuality is a curable disease. Studies
have indicated that the only aspect of homosexuality that can be cured
is that found in the bisexual. A bisexual is distinguished from a homosexual in that a homosexual has sexual contact only with persons of
the same sex, and a bisexual has sexual contact with persons of both
sexes. The latter have occasionally been cured by psychiatric treat82

ment, whereas the "true" homosexual is not curable.

Hoffman, in The Gay World, argues that the primary reason the dis-

ease concept is popular is that it presents an escape when rationalizing
homosexuality and its place in society.

He contends that the disease

concept:
offers a way out in conceptualizing the problem. People don't like
to think of homosexuality as sinful any longer, because the whole
concept of sin has gone out of Western culture. To describe
homosexuality as morally evil is now unfavorable. And yet the alternative, considering it as a legitimate way of life for some people,
is simply not palatable to very many. Hence, the popularity
of the disease concept. If homosexuality is labeled an illness, we
can avoid these other alternatives. We don't need to blame the
homosexual, and yet we don't have to accept him. He is simply
sick and hence, what we really want to do is find a way of curing
83
him.
Like the causes of homosexuality, there is no clear explanation for
heterosexual deviant behavior. What was considered perversion 50

years ago would today be a "normal" sex act.

Modern insights into

human behavior have radically changed society's views on the subject

of perversion.

Marriage manuals and sex education materials stress

81 GAY WORLD at 148:

Bieber's characteristic homosexual-producing mother is over-close and over-

intimate with her son. She is very much afraid of losing the son and thus is
possessive, and this possessiveness results in a kind of demasculinization of
him. She favors that son . . . over her other children and often over the
husband as well, and encourages an alliance with him against the father, so
that the son is alienated from masculine identification. She is herself
puritanically sexually frigid but, on the other hand, her closeness stimulates
the son sexually so that he is aroused and at the same time inhibited in the
presence of a woman. This is a crucial factor in his later inability to relate
sexually to women, for as a child he has to severely repress his overaroused
heterosexual feelings.
See also Parent Pattern of a Homo, San Francisco Chronicle, November 6, 1969.
82 Cantor, Deviation and the Criminal Law, 55 J.C.L. 441 (1955); ERNEST VAN
DEN HAAo, NOTES ON HOMOSExUALITY AND ITS CULTURAL SETrING 297 (1963):
Many homosexuals are neurotic or psychotic and seek the help of analysts, as
do many heterosexuals. It does not follow that homosexuality itself is an
illness--that it is always associated with clinical symptoms . . . of disturbance.
See also GAY WORLD at 197 for a discussion relating to the average cost to cure a
bisexual.
83 GAY WORLD at 196.
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"natural" freedom and conclude that ". . . no act of intimacy that
brings pleasure to both members of the mating should be considered improper or taboo."8 4 It can reasonably be inferred that the sexual behavior of contemporary adult society has changed markedly during the
last decade. Modem social norms of sexual conduct may not permit
the identification of "deviant" sex conduct at least with regard to conduct between consenting heterosexual adults. 88 (This statement as-

sumes the exclusion of the problems encountered with sadistic, or masochistic sexual conduct and sexual conduct with minors as noted

above).

86

In final analysis, there is really no certainty as to the causal factors
which make up a deviant sexual behavior pattern, whether homosexual
or heterosexual. Though it goes without question that some of the
subject conduct is brought about by psychological defects and is no
more the proper object of penal sanctions than insanity, the overwhelming percentage of persons who engage in such conduct cannot be simply classified as ill. Hence, it cannot be soundly argued that deviant
sexual behavior is an improper object of criminal sanctions as with
alcoholism or narcotic addiction.
Constitutional Problems Encountered By The Present Statutes. Involved in any constitutional question relating to state regulation is the
determination of whether the due process guarantees of life, liberty and
property prevent such regulation. A police power regulation does not
conflict with these fundamental rights guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment so long as the regulation is reasonable, not arbitrary or
discriminatory, and pursuant to a substantial state interest."
It is
fundamental that state regulation and control of individual conduct
which is harmful to society in general is a proper purpose and not in
derogation of the concept of "liberty". 88 Some would argue that deviant sexual conduct is an affront to the moral integrety of society; destroys
the meaning and purpose of sex; and undermines the basic concept of
marriage and family. Additionally, it may present a serious threat to
the well being of children and constitute a public nuisance for adults.
84

Id. at 212. See also 0. BUTTERFIELD, SEXUAL HARMONY
O.BUTTERFIELD,

T1,
MARRLGE (1955).

SEXUAL HARMONY I MARRIAGE (1955); D. REUBEN, EVRYTHING You ALWAYS WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT SEX (1970).
88 This comment makes no attempt to advocate legalization of deviant sexual acts
85

(heterosexual or homosexual) involving masochistic or sadistic behavior or with parties
lacking capacity to consent.
87 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 48 (1905).
88

Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).

The Legislature may enjoin, permit, forbid, and punish; they may declare
new crimes; and establish rules of conduct for all its citizens in future cases;
they may command what is right, and prohibit what is wrong ....
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Hence, state regulation of deviant sexual conduct is for the health, safety
and welfare of its citizens and has a reasonable relationship to a proper
state interest.
However, it can be argued that not all deviant sex conduct presents a
direct harm to the health, safety and welfare of society. Consensual sex
conduct, whether deviant or not, carried on within the private domain of
the individual participants would seemingly present very little harm to
the welfare of society and may even be protected from state regulation
under the constitutional right to privacy.89
Although the right of privacy is not specifically enumerated in the
Constitution, the Court has used two theories to identify privacy as a
constitutional right. The foremost argument set forth has been that the
right of privacy is a penumbial part of the Bill of Rights. 90 In other
words, within the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights are overlapping implied guarantees which come together to form a right of privacy.
A second interpretation holds that the right of privacy is a fundamental constitutional right implied in the ninth amendment.
To hold that a right so basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted
in our society. . . may be infringed because that right is not guaranteed in so many words by the first eight amendments to the
Constitution is to ignore the Ninth Amendment and to give it no
effect whatsoever. 91
Since the interest of a state in protecting or preserving the foundations
of marriage and the family are not sufficiently compelling to justify
a regulation concerning whether or not married couples could prevent
conception during sexual intercourse, it seems even less likely that such
interest would justify state regulation of the manner in which married
couples engaged in sexual acts. Consequently, so called "deviant"
sexual conduct between married couples would be within the protection
of the constitutional right of privacy.

Arguably the state's interest in preventing promiscuous sexual behavior or the spread of veneral disease may be substantially compelling
to justify state interference with private sexual conduct between consenting unmarried adults. Such interference might be in the form of a
regulation proscribing deviant sexual conduct. However, there appears to be little if any reasonable relationship between the prevention
89 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
90 Id. at 484; Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516-522 (dissenting opinion) (1961);
See Beaney, The ConstitutionalRight to Privacy, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 212 (1962).
91 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 491 (Opinion of Justice Goldberg)
(1965).
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of deviant sexual conduct and the prevention of promiscuity. It seems
highly unlikely that individual sexual behavior would tend to become

any more promiscuous after engaging in a deviant sexual act than it
would as a result of a "nondeviant" sexual act. In addition, it seems
unlikely that the spread of veneral disease would be anymore enhanced
because of the kind of sexual conduct involved. Logically, the etiological agents of such diseases are incapable of distinguishing the manner in
which the human bodies come together for sexual enjoyment. 2 Therefore, it would appear from this reasoning that there is little if any
reasonable relationship between the state interest and the prevention of
deviant sexual conduct. If the right of privacy discussed by the Court
in Griswold v. Connecticut9 3 extends to consensual sex conduct between
adults, whether married or not, when the conduct occurs in private,
state interference with that conduct could only be justified if based on
an overriding, compelling state interest. Prevention of promiscuity or
spread of disease would not appear to be such overriding interests.
It seems from the outset that the state's interest in protecting its citizens from exposure to morally indecent or distasteful conduct would
not justify interference with private deviant sexual conduct between
consenting adults since this conduct would not be susceptible to public
observation.
Consequently, absent some other compelling state interest not yet
discussed, it would seem reasonable to conclude that private sexual conduct between consenting adults, even if deviant, is protected by the Constitution from state interference.
Based on the above reasoning, any legislative sanctions imposed to
prohibit deviant sexual conduct would necessarily be limited to regulation of public conduct. The interest justifying such regulation would
be the interest of the state to protect its citizens from unwanted exposure to morally degrading and indecent acts. Such public exposure
would most likely not be protected from state interference by any right
to privacy since it cannot reasonably be intended as private.
Incarceration. The statutes in California and other states intending to
define the permissible range of sexual activities often impose harsh penalties for conviction of deviant sexual conduct. 94 Seven states including
California place no maximum sentence on convictions for sodomy, and
02
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Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

KINSEY, FEMALE 483:
There appears to be no other major culture in the world in which public
opinion and the statute law so severely penalize homosexual relationships
94

as they do in the United States today.
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permit a life sentence."

Thirteen states provide for a maximum sen-

more"0

tence of 20 years or
and eighteen states impose a 10 to 15 year
maximum.97
Incarceration as a method of deterring deviant sexual conduct seems
inappropriate and questionable since the cost of imprisonment outweighs
the social harm created by such "offensive public conduct," and placing homosexuals in an all-male or all-female environment is conducive
98
to further homosexual behavior.
Imprisonment acting as a deterrent on other possible offenders has
little effect. However, Cantor suggests that "to the extent that some may
dabble casually in such activity (deviant sexual acts), the law may have
a deterrent capacity, since the desire is, by definition, not a drive but a
curiosity." 99

There being no victim in a consensual deviant sex act between two
adults of the same sex there is little justification for punishment of this
conduct on the theory of retribution. The only possible social interest
served by imprisoning the violators is predicated on the theory of restraint
to safeguard the right of society to be free from offensive conduct carried on in public. This right to be free from exposure of such offensive
conduct must be balanced against, and is arguably outweighed by, the
cost of incarceration. 100
A final argument for imprisonment of the deviant sex offender, particularly the homosexual, is rehabilitation. Rehabilitation must begin

with the desire of the actor to change, not the desire of society to change
him. This paramount factor is typically not present in the consenting
male or female homosexual.'' Without this desire all efforts would
seem meaningless.
Conclusion

In the area of deviant sexual conduct, it is time for the legislature to
revise the laws to conform with the area where it has a legitimate purpose for regulation, i.e., to preserve public order and decency, to pro95 Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Idaho, California, New York (1st
degree only). 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. at 663.
90 Ohio, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina (60), Hawaii, Arkansas, Arizona, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Utah, Connecticut and Florida. Id.
97 Texas, Wyoming, Indiana, Mississippi, North Dakota, Alaska, Colorado,
Maryland, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, Iowa, Illinois (only for nonconsensual acts), Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Georgia, Alabama. ld.
98 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. at 790, et seq.
99 Cantor, Deviation and the CriminalLaw, 55 J.C.L. 441, 448 (1964).
100 Proceedings of the Sentencing Institute for Superior Court Judges, 45 Cal.
Rptr. appendix at 25 (1965); 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 789, n.102, states that the daily
cost of incarceration is 9 times the cost of supervision of the same person on probation.
101 BERGLER, HOMOSEXUALITy (1956).
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tect society from offensive and injurious conduct. The legislature must
recognize the distinction between laws that actually affect the above
purposes and laws which intervene without justification in the private
lives of persons whose conduct does not harm society. As the Wolfendon report concluded:
[T]here must remain a realm of private morality and immorality
10 2
which is, in brief and crude terms, none of the law's business.
Enforcement of laws proscribing private sexual conduct between adults
may clearly violate the constitutional rights of those against whom enforcement might be attempted. Statutes that now have the affect of
proscribing conduct that is beyond the scope of the legitimate purpose
should be removed from the books.
Thomas T. Couris
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